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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

STATE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PERSPECTIVES ON A POSSIBLE POST-ROE WORLD

STEPHEN GARDBAUM*

INTRODUCTION
In his Childress Lecture and the published Article based on it, Richard
Fallon has provided a characteristically systematic, rigorous, and lucid
analytical account of the constitutional landscape if the Supreme Court were to
overrule Roe v. Wade.1 The focus of his analysis is on identifying and
correcting four common fallacies about the constitutional consequences of
such a decision, because the decision-makers and the rest of us should have a
“clear-eyed view”2 ahead of time of what those consequences would be. These
fallacies are: that it would (1) wipe the legal slate clean for new state statutes
regulating abortion, (2) necessarily return responsibility for whether abortion is
permitted or forbidden to the states, (3) end federal court involvement in the
abortion wars, and (4) be a self-contained decision with no ripple effects on the
rest of fundamental rights jurisprudence.3 Professor Fallon states that overall,
he is most concerned with the third fallacy, the one he describes as “perhaps
the most important fallacy.”4
In my comments, I will primarily be underscoring and supplementing what
Professor Fallon says about the first and third fallacies, by providing what I
hope are some helpful and interesting details from the fields of state and
comparative constitutional law, respectively.
The first fallacy identified by Professor Fallon is that overruling Roe would
hand the entire responsibility for framing abortion policy to current and future

* Professor of Law, UCLA. I would like to thank Joel Goldstein for inviting me to participate,
Dick Fallon for presenting such a wonderful lecture on which to comment, fellow panelists Susan
Appleton, Michael Greve, and Mark Rosen for an extremely interesting and lively session, Alan
Howard for his gracious hospitality, Dani Davis and the other members of the Law Journal for
superb organization, and Scott Dewey for outstanding research assistance.
1. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a PostRoe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611 (2007).
2. Id. at 653.
3. Id. at 611–14.
4. Id. at 612.
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state legislatures.5 In his words, it “would essentially wipe the legal slate clean
and frame only prospective issues about whether the states should adopt new
statutes regulating abortion.”6 In explaining why this proposition is “false,”
Professor Fallon points to the many states in which pre-Roe statutes remain on
the books and would again become operative and enforceable unless repealed. 7
In this context, he also mentions that some state constitutions may recognize
abortion rights that the federal Constitution would cease to protect.8 In Part I, I
will elaborate on this statement by providing some details about existing state
constitutional treatment of abortion, both protective and restrictive, that (unless
amended) would take the issue away from state legislatures altogether in the
event that Roe were overruled.
The third, and “perhaps most important,” fallacy identified and corrected
by Professor Fallon is that no significant federal constitutional issues about
state power to regulate abortion would remain if Roe were overruled.9
Consequently, the federal courts would be out of the “abortion wars.”10 By
contrast, he argues, a host of important and complex constitutional issues about
state power would arise in the likely event that at least some pro-life states
seek to prevent their citizens from obtaining lawful abortions in pro-choice
states.11 For example, a pro-life state may ban the advertising or counseling
within its borders of legal abortions in a pro-choice state, or prevent its citizens
from traveling to obtain legal out-of-state abortions.12 In Part II, I underscore
Professor Fallon’s argument by providing examples from comparative
constitutional law in which foreign courts have already been presented with
similar issues and have found them difficult to resolve.
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON ABORTION
As Professor Fallon discusses, it is sometimes suggested that if Roe were
overruled, the issue of abortion would be returned not simply to the states but
specifically to the majoritarian processes of state legislatures.13 A normative
argument involving an appeal not just to federalism but to democracy
sometimes accompanies this descriptive claim: the abortion issue should be
decided by voters and their representatives and not by judges. In fact, under
5. Id. at 611–12.
6. Fallon, supra note 1, at 611.
7. Id. at 611–12.
8. Id. at 616 (“One obvious question for state courts would be whether their state
constitutions possibly recognize abortion rights that the federal Constitution would cease to
protect if Roe were overruled.”).
9. Id. at 612.
10. Id.
11. Fallon, supra note 1, at 612–13.
12. Id. at 613.
13. Id. at 614.
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existing state constitutional law, in many states the issue will not be decided by
state legislatures but by state judges, and in most cases this will happen
without the benefit of express constitutional provision on abortion one way or
the other.
To flesh out this latter point first, currently no state constitution expressly
grants a right to abortion. Indeed, only three state constitutions overtly refer to
abortion in any way, and two do so to deny such a right. Thus, the Arkansas
Constitution states that “[t]he policy of Arkansas is to protect the life of every
unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the Federal
Constitution.”14 In addition, it states that “[n]o public funds will be used to
pay for any abortion, except to save the mother’s life.”15 The Rhode Island
Constitution contains the following sentence at the very end of the section
setting out its Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses: “Nothing in this
section shall be construed to grant or secure any right relating to abortion or
the funding thereof.”16 Finally, Colorado also expressly bans the public
funding of abortions.17
Notwithstanding this absence of any express right, we will see in a moment
that ten state supreme courts have held that their state constitutions contain an
independent right to abortion.18 But let us briefly stand back and view the
spectrum of positions that states could in principle take in their constitutional
treatment of abortion. Quite generally, there are three possible positions.
First, a state constitution may contain language that, in the event of Roe’s
overruling, would prohibit abortions—or at least those consistent with the new
federal constitutional minimum.19 In this situation, currently illustrated most
clearly by Arkansas, the issue of abortion would be decided by the state
constitution and not the legislature. Second, state constitutions may take no
independent constitutional position on abortion. This could be either because

14. ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 2.
15. Id. at § 1.
16. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2.
17. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50 (“No public funds shall be used by the State of Colorado, its
agencies or political subdivisions to pay or otherwise reimburse, either directly or indirectly, any
person, agency or facility for the performance of any induced abortion.”).
18. These ten are: Alaska, California, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee, and West Virginia. See Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coal. for
Choice, 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997); Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rts. v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779
(Cal. 1981); N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. Florida, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla.
2003); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 1997);
Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995); Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364
(Mont. 1999); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 1995 (N.J. 1982); N.M. Right to
Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998); Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v.
Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000); Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446
S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1993).
19. Such as a required exception for the life, and probably also the health, of the mother.
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abortion is not protected (though also not prohibited) by the state constitution
at all, as currently seen in Rhode Island, or because state constitutional
protection of abortion is coextensive with the federal Constitution. In either
case, in the event that Roe is overruled, the issue would then be up to state
legislatures (subject to any preexisting state statutes on the subject). Third,
state constitutions may provide independent and stronger constitutional
protection for abortion than the federal Constitution, in which case they rather
than state legislatures would determine abortion rights in the event of Roe’s
overruling. This would, of course, be an example of the familiar but important
phenomenon of the ability of states to offer greater constitutional rights than
the federal minimum.
Currently, ten state supreme courts clearly fall into this third category
because they have held that their state constitutions contain an independent
right to abortion.20 Of these ten, four have done so on the basis of an express
right of privacy that they have interpreted to include choosing abortion.21 The
other six implied the independent right to abortion from the state’s due process
or equal protection clause, supplemented in some cases by one or more other
clauses.22
Moreover, most of these ten state supreme courts have explicitly held that
state constitutional protection of abortion is, even now, greater than federal
protection, at least in certain respects.23 They did so in the course of openly
rejecting specific U.S. Supreme Court case law for state constitutional
purposes, specifically Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey24 and/or Harris v. McRae.25 Thus, in interpreting the scope of their
independent rights to abortion, the three supreme courts of Alaska, Florida, and
Tennessee each expressly rejected Casey’s undue burden standard in favor of
strict scrutiny under a fundamental rights analysis.26 Interestingly, they echoed
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Casey by variously criticizing the undue burden
20. For the list, see supra note 18.
21. These four are: Alaska, California, Florida, and Montana. See Mat-Su Coal. for Choice,
948 P.2d 963; Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rts., 625 P.2d 779; N. Fla. Women’s Health &
Counseling Servs., 866 So. 2d 612; Armstrong, 989 P.2d 364.
22. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on three provisions in the state constitution as
the source of the right to privacy (and, thereby, abortion): the rights and privileges provision
(MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2), the due process provision (MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7), and the
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure (MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10). Gomez, 542
N.W.2d 17.
23. Several of them relied on their express rights of privacy to justify stronger state than
federal protection. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
25. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
26. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d at 971; N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Serv.,
866 So. 2d at 625–26; Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 15–17
(Tenn. 2000).
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standard as “inherently ambiguous” and “subjective,” rather than directly as
too low.27 The Minnesota Supreme Court has also protected the right to
abortion with a strict scrutiny standard post-Casey, but without expressly
rejecting or even discussing its undue burden standard.28 Five other state
supreme courts have expressly rejected Harris v. McRae and held that a
selective decision to provide public funding for childbirth but not for abortions
interferes with and violates the state constitutional right to abortion, even if not
the federal constitutional right.29
In addition to these ten states, there are nine other states in which either (a)
a court lower than the state supreme court has recognized an independent state
constitutional right to abortion, or (b) a state supreme court has recognized a
state constitutional right to privacy in other contexts but has not yet ruled on
whether this includes abortion.30 The best known examples of this latter
position are probably Georgia and Kentucky, where during the reign of Bowers
v. Hardwick31 and prior to Lawrence v. Texas,32 the state supreme courts held
that the state due process clause grants a right of privacy that includes
homosexual sodomy.33
On the other hand, as we have seen, only one state, Arkansas, currently
seems to occupy the first position: that abortion would be constitutionally
prohibited in the event that Roe is overruled.34 Three additional state supreme
courts have explicitly held that there is no independent or greater protection for
abortion under the state constitution than the federal.35 That is, the two are
coextensive so they would follow an overruling of Roe.
In sum, currently there are at least eleven, and possibly as many as twenty,
states in which the legislatures’ hands would be tied on the abortion issue by
27. Casey, 505 U.S. at 983–91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 31–32 (Minn. 1995).
29. These states are: California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, and West
Virginia. See, e.g., Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rts. v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981); Planned
Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 1997); Right to Choose
v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982); N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841
(N.M. 1998); Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1993).
30. These nine states are: Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Oregon, and Vermont. CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., WHAT IF ROE FELL?: THE STATE-BYSTATE CONSEQUENCES OF OVERTURNING ROE V. WADE 12 & n.37 (2004),
http://www.crlp.org/pdf/bo_whatifroefell.pdf.
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
33. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 25–26 (Ga. 1998); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842
S.W.2d 487, 501–02 (Ky. 1992).
34. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
35. These states are: Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627
N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub. Walfare, 482 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1984), aff’d 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985); Bell v. Low-Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253
(Tex. 2002).
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their state constitutions in the event that Roe is overruled—nineteen actually or
potentially granting abortion rights and one in which abortion is prohibited.
II. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES
In this section, I discuss a fairly well-known series of events in
comparative constitutional law to underscore Professor Fallon’s point, in
correcting the third fallacy, that there will still be difficult and complex federal
constitutional issues for courts to resolve concerning state power to regulate
abortion even if Roe is overruled.36 Such issues, he argues, would be raised by
likely attempts on the part of some pro-life states to seal their borders and
prevent their citizens from learning about, or traveling to, abortions in prochoice states.37
As these constitutional issues only arise where there are different abortion
laws in different states, they are premised on regulatory federalism regarding
abortion policy—even where their resolution is a matter of individual rights
rather than constitutional federalism. To the best of my knowledge, none of
these issues has in fact been, or is likely to be, raised in any of the best known
domestic federalism systems abroad: Germany, Canada, Switzerland, and
Australia. Before turning to the two other federal systems that do provide a
parallel, it might be helpful briefly to explain why this is.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the general issue of abortion has
raised enormously important and well-known constitutional issues, so much so
that the contrast in approach between the U.S. Supreme Court and the German
Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is a standard topic in comparative
constitutional law courses and casebooks.38 It even occasionally makes its way
into first year Constitutional Law classes.39 Indeed, at first blush, the “antiRoe” quality of the FCC’s First Abortion decision in 197540 might be assumed
to have established in fact the hypothetical world upon which Professor
Fallon’s lecture has focused us. In reality, however, the sort of federalismrelated constitutional issues that he persuasively argues would likely arise in a
post-Roe world did not arise in Germany for two structural reasons that
differentiate German and U.S. constitutional law.
36. Fallon, supra note 1, at 612–13.
37. Id. at 613.
38. For example, both the first and second editions of Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet’s
casebook, Comparative Constitutional Law, discuss this contrast at length in the opening chapter.
See, e.g., VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–142
(1999).
39. Such as those of my colleagues Professors Ken Karst and Bill Rubenstein.
40. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Consitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.); see also Robert E. Jonas
& John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL
J. PRAC. & PROC. 605 (1976) (translating the FCC’s decision).
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First, the FCC has interpreted Germany’s Basic Law to include several
positive or “protective” constitutional duties on the part of the state. By
contrast, it is generally understood to be an axiomatic feature of the U.S.
Constitution that its rights provisions impose only negative duties on the
state.41 One of the most famous of these positive duties was announced in the
First Abortion decision of 1975 leading to the conclusion that not only was
criminalization of abortion constitutionally permitted (the issue in Roe) but it
was constitutionally required—as the only acceptable means by which the
state could fulfill its constitutional duty to protect all life, including that of the
fetus.42 Accordingly, the scope for differences among state abortion laws that
underlies Professor Fallon’s argument does not exist in the German case,
where the constitution was held to mandate the opposite uniform federal rule
than in Roe.
The second reason is the different nature of German federalism. Although
the FCC has arguably been more successful than the U.S. Supreme Court in
protecting remaining state sovereignty against the forces of centralization,43 it
started from a position in which the constitutional text unambiguously left far
less to protect. The total list of enumerated federal legislative powers—
exclusive, concurrent, and “framework”—is very long by U.S. standards.
Abortion regulation is, and always has been, understood to be within the
general field of criminal law, all of which (under Article 74 of the Basic
Law44) is within the enumerated concurrent power granted to the federal
legislature. This power has been continuously exercised (thus preempting the
states from the field), and it was the liberalizing 1974 federal legislation45 that
was successfully challenged in the First Abortion case46 and then amended.
Following unification with East Germany, new federal legislation was enacted,

41. For an interesting and thoughtful discussion of the differences between the two systems
on this score, see David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV
864 (1986).
42. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Consitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.); see also Jonas & Gorby,
supra note 40, at 605–06, 609–10.
43. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
36–37 (1994) (“A few [decisions of the FCC interpreting the provisions granting exclusive
federal legislative authority] are of significant interest, not least because they reflect a sensitivity
toward reserved state authority that has been conspicuously missing from decisions of our
Supreme Court for the past fifty-five years”).
44. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] (Federal Constitution) art. 74
(F.R.G.).
45. Fünftes Strafrechtsreformgesetz vom [Fifth Statute to Reform Penal Law], June 18,
1974, BGBl. I at 1297, § 218 (F.R.G.).
46. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.).
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successfully challenged in part in the second FCC abortion decision of 1993,47
and amended two years later.48 But the presence (and probably the
requirement under the positive duty) of uniform national legislation on the
topic means that the kind of differences in state law on which Professor
Fallon’s post-Roe constitutional issues are premised do not exist.49
This second reason also applies to Canadian federalism, although in a
slightly different way that has come to have enormous practical implications.
Here too, abortion regulation is conceived of, and has in fact been, a species of
criminal law, which under Section 91(27) of the Constitution Act of 1867—the
relevant constitutional text—is a field under exclusive federal jurisdiction.50
This obviously creates an even stronger contrast with the U.S. situation in
which state legislative competence over abortion is at least concurrent with that
of Congress—and has long been primary in both fact and theory.51 Unlike,
Germany, however, there is at present essentially no federal law on abortion in
Canada.52 This is because in 1988 the Canadian Supreme Court struck down
the main part of the 1969 federal abortion law, Section 251 of the Criminal
Code,53 as inconsistent with Section 7 of the new Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,54 and ever since then, the federal parliament has not been willing or

47. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 88
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 203 (F.R.G.).
48. For discussion of the new unified abortion law of 1995, see Rosemarie Will, German
Unification and the Reform of Abortion Law, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 399 (1996).
49. Professor Fallon argues, in correcting what he identifies as the second fallacy (that the
issue of abortion would necessarily be returned to the states), that Congress could regulate the
whole field—either permitting or prohibiting abortion—under current understandings of the
scope of its Commerce Clause power, and therefore take the issue away from the states
altogether. Fallon, supra note 1, at 621–25. If so, the U.S. would in this respect be in the same
position as Germany and the differing state laws raising the difficult constitutional issues (in his
discussion of the third fallacy) would be preempted.
50. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3, § 91 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5
(Appendix 1985).
51. It is concurrent if Professor Fallon is correct (as I think he is) that abortion regulation
would be within the scope of Congress’s commerce power as currently understood; otherwise,
state power would be exclusive.
52. This would almost certainly not be possible in Germany because of the positive
constitutional duty imposed on the federal government to protect the life of the fetus in some
constitutionally acceptable manner. See supra notes 42, 48; see, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Casey
in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 273, 275 (1995).
53. R. v. Morgantaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. Section 51 of the Criminal Code created an
exception to the criminal nature of abortion, under which women could obtain legal abortions if a
hospital’s three-doctor “therapeutic abortion committee” decided that the continuation of the
pregnancy would be likely to endanger the mother’s life or health. See id.
54. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 7 (U.K.) (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty
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able to enact new legislation. The attempt of one province, Nova Scotia, to
step in and criminalize abortions performed outside hospitals was also struck
down by the Canadian Supreme Court, on the federalism ground that the
provinces lack competence to enact criminal laws.55
Switzerland offers a slight variation on the theme in that although
legislating about abortion is a federal matter, Swiss federalism grants the
cantons not only the power and duty to administer most federal law (including
this), but also significant freedom to interpret and apply it differently.56 Thus,
more liberal and conservative cantons interpreted the exception for the health
of the mother contained in the long-surviving 1937 federal law57 in quite
different ways, resulting in some “abortion-tourism.” This interpretive
freedom, however, does not extend to imposing new substantive restrictions of
the sort Professor Fallon hypothesizes in a post-Roe world, and none have been
imposed or adjudicated. The 1937 federal law was replaced by a far more
liberal one as a result of a referendum in 2002.58
Closer to home, legally if not geographically, is Australia. For here,
regulation of abortion, unlike in Germany, Canada, and Switzerland, is
reserved (exclusively) to the eight states and territories.59 Each does in fact
have different laws on abortion.60 Accordingly, the sort of post-Roe interstate
constitutional issues would be possible, but in actual fact they have not arisen.
Although different, the laws of the various states and territories are nowhere
near as different as they would likely be in a post-Roe United States, largely
for matters of underlying political and religious culture. While abortion is
undoubtedly a controversial topic, it is not as controversial as in the U.S. and,
moreover, supporters of both sides are more evenly spread as compared with
the very marked regional/state differences in the U.S. The net result is that

and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.”).
55. R v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463.
56. See UNITED NATIONS POPULATION DIV. OF DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., ABORTION
POLICIES: A GLOBAL REVIEW 117 (2002), available at www.un.org/esa/population/publications/
abortion/doc/switzerland.doc.
57. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [StGB], Code pénal suisse [Cp], Codice penale
swizzero [Cp] [Criminal Code] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311.0 (1938), art. 119 ¶ 2 (Switz.).
58. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [StGB], Code pénal suisse [Cp], Codice penale
swizzero [Cp] [Criminal Code] Dec. 21, 1937, 54 AS at 757 (1938), as amended by Mar. 23,
2001, AS 2989 (2002), art. 119 ¶ 2 (Switz.); see also Julia L. Ernst et al., The Global Pattern of
U.S. Initiatives Curtailing Women’s Reproductive Rights: A Perspective on the Increasingly AntiChoice Mosaic, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 762 (2004).
59. Criminal law is not among the enumerated powers granted to the federal government in
Sections 51–52 of the Australia Constitution. Accordingly, its criminal law powers are interstitial
and incidental in nature and do not include the regulation of abortion. AUSTL. CONST. § 51–52.
60. See, e.g., Jenny Stokes, Abortion—The Law in Australia, http://www.saltshakers.org.au/
html/P/5/B/99/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
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abortion is legally available throughout Australia, with the major differences
relating to the degree and necessary proof of maternal health risk involved.61
No state or territory has enacted the type of bans on advertising or travel that
would likely raise the difficult constitutional issues in the U.S.
Comparative constitutional law, however, does offer at least one close and
relevant analogy to these potential post-Roe situations, although it involves not
a domestic federal system but two transnational ones. These are the European
Union (EU) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), both of
which have increasingly taken on the features of full-blown federal
constitutional structures.62 In the early 1990s, the highest courts of each
institution struggled to resolve the complex interstate constitutional issues
raised by Ireland’s attempts to prevent its citizens from traveling to the United
Kingdom for legal abortions.
Both the EU and ECHR grant a substantial number of rights to individual
citizens of the respective member states that their governments are legally
bound to respect. Articles 2 to 13 of the ECHR, together with several
subsequent protocols, contain a list of enumerated rights, including, inter alia,
the rights to life, liberty and security, a fair trial, respect for private and family
life, and freedom of thought and expression.63 The Treaty of Rome,64 often
referred to as “the constitution of the EU,” contains in its original parts the socalled “four freedoms” of free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor
that structure the common or single market, together with the general right
against discrimination on the grounds of nationality and the right of women to
equal pay for equal work.65 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
61. Id.
62. The ECHR is an international treaty that all members of the Council of Europe (now,
essentially all countries in Europe) are required to ratify as a condition of membership. See, e.g.,
Vessela V. Stoyanova, The Council of Europe’s Monitoring Mechanisms and Their Relation to
Eastern European Member States’ Noncompliance, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 739, 747 (2005).
The Council of Europe is a broader inter-governmental organization that is quite distinct from,
and predates, the European Union. The latter is a smaller, supranational organization constituted
and governed by the Treaty of Rome, now comprising twenty-seven member states with the
admission of ten from central and eastern Europe in 2004. It started in 1957 with six original
member-states, and then grew to nine with admission of Ireland, U.K., and Denmark in 1973, and
twelve in 1986. See The History of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/history/
index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
63. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 1,
1998, Europ. T.S. 155.
64. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
65. Each of these is contained in separate Articles: Article 12 (discrimination on grounds of
nationality), Article 23 (goods), Article 39 (labor), Article 49 (services), Article 56 (capital),
Article 141 (equal pay for male and female workers for equal work). See Consolidated Version
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 OJ (C 324) 33
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. Over the years, several additional rights have been added to the Treaty,
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and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), respectively the highest courts of the
ECHR and the EU, enforce these rights and interpret the treaties, which have
both taken on many features of domestic federal constitutions.
Despite the existence of such individual rights, neither court has found a
right to abortion in its constitutive treaties. Moreover, in the EU at least (the
Council of Europe has no legislative powers), and unlike in Germany, Canada,
and Switzerland, abortion is generally understood to be a subject within
member state and not federal legislative competence.66 Accordingly, both the
ECHR and the EU are, very broadly speaking, in the position that would hold
in the United States were Roe overruled—a system of constitutional federalism
enforced by courts but without a federal constitutional right to abortion.
Despite the absence of such a right, however, member state laws regulating
abortion have raised some very difficult federal constitutional issues for both
courts, just as Professor Fallon predicts would be the case in the United States
if Roe were overruled.67 As testament to their difficulty, both courts have been
divided over, and punted, the relevant issues wherever possible—even without
having the U.S. Supreme Court’s discretionary power to pick and choose its
cases.
In the early 1990s, the two courts were faced with the issue of the validity
of Irish laws that regulated abortion in similar ways to the hypothetical, prolife state of “Utah” in Professor Fallon’s Article. Here, a brief recounting of
the factual and legal background is necessary.
Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution provides that “[t]he State
acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal
right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.”68 This provision
has been held by the Irish Supreme Court to outlaw all abortions except where
there is real and substantial risk to the life of the mother that only abortion can
prevent.69
In a unanimous 1988 decision, the Irish Supreme Court also held that
Article 40.3.3 prohibits a private, not-for-profit health organization from
including the rights attached to being a citizen of the Union, inter alia, the right to move and
reside freely within the territory of the member states, and the right to vote in elections in the state
of residence. See EC Treaty, supra. The EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is
not yet in effect, having been caught up in the rejection of the new EU Constitution by referenda
in France and the Netherlands.
66. See, e.g., Chad M. Gerson, Toward an International Standard of Abortion Rights: Two
Obstacles, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 753, 754 (2005).
67. See Fallon, supra note 1.
68. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/
index.asp?docID=243.
69. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. X & Others, [1992] 2 CMLR 277; see also Shannon Renton
Wolf, Making Waves: Circumventing Domestic Law on the High Seas, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 109, 111 (2003).
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counseling women about the availability of legal abortion services in the
United Kingdom (where most Irish women go for abortions), even where it
does so in a “non-directive” manner; i.e., it does not prescribe or advise
abortions but provides requested information.70 It therefore upheld the
injunction issued by a lower court in the constitutional tort proceedings
brought by the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC).71 And,
in a separate case the following year, it similarly upheld a lower court
injunction obtained by SPUC against a student organization for disseminating
names and addresses of abortion providers in the United Kingdom.72 In a third
case in 1992, a lower court also issued an injunction preventing a rape victim
from traveling to the United Kingdom for an abortion.73 This decision was,
however, overruled by the Supreme Court on the basis of the exception for risk
to the mother’s life74—but by implication, absent such serious risk, the
Constitution prohibited traveling abroad to obtain an abortion.
The injunction against counseling in the first case, Open Door, was
appealed by the defendant health organization from the Irish Supreme Court to
the ECtHR on the basis that it violated the organization’s right to freedom of
expression under Article 10 of the ECHR, as well as the right to respect for
private life under Article 8.75 The injunction against the student organization
in the second case, Grogan, was the subject of a preliminary reference to the
ECJ76 on the question of whether the distribution of information about abortion

70. Soc’y for the Prot. of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. (SPUC) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. &
Dublin Wellwoman Ctr. Ltd., [1988] I.R. 593, 626–27 (Ir.). It needs to be noted that in Ireland,
(a) constitutional provisions may bind private actors, and (b) courts are included in the state
institutions whose actions are bound to respect Article 40.3.3. See id.
71. Id. at 619.
72. Soc’y for the Prot. of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. (SPUC) v. Grogan, [1989] I.R. 753 (Ir.).
73. See Att’y Gen. v. X & others, [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 277 (Ir.).
74. Id. The Court accepted that there was reason to believe the girl would kill herself if
prevented from having an abortion. Id.
75. Open Door Counselling & Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. 244, 257
(1992). As the ECtHR noted, no doubt to its relief, the defendants did not claim there was a right
to choose an abortion under the ECHR that Ireland infringed. Id. at 270.
76. A preliminary reference under Article 234 of the Treaty of Rome is a procedure whereby
a national court may, and sometimes must, seek a ruling from the European Court of Justice on a
question of the interpretation of EU law that arises in a case before it:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a)the interpretation of the Treaty;
...
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court
or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to
give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that
court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

STATE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

697

services outside Ireland was protected by EU law and, in particular, by the
fundamental principle of freedom to supply services.77
In Open Door, the ECtHR found that the Irish ban on counseling about the
availability of legal abortions in the United Kingdom did indeed violate the
defendant’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR.78
Although Article 10 permits freedom of expression to be limited if “necessary
in a democratic society” for one of the specified legitimate aims (which
include the protection of morals),79 the ECtHR, applying its standard test of
“proportionality,” found the injunction to be disproportionate.80 Relevant
factors for the ECtHR were the absolute and perpetual nature of the injunction,
its ineffectiveness in preventing abortions in the UK, and the fact that the
information was available elsewhere, albeit from sources less protective of
women’s health.81 Nonetheless, the court was unusually divided, splitting by
fifteen votes to eight.82 Moreover, in addition to the opinion for the court,
there were seven separately published dissenting, partly dissenting, “separate,”
or concurring opinions, a rare occurrence reflecting the sensitivity and
perceived difficulty of the issue.83 Having found for the defendant on the
Article 10 claim, the ECtHR declined to consider the Article 8 privacy claim.84
In Grogan, the ECJ held that Ireland had not violated the defendants’
freedom to provide services under EU law.85 In so doing, however, it
answered only the narrowest question raised by the facts—whether these
particular students had a relevant right under EU law.86 Thus, on the one hand,

EC Treaty, supra note 65, at art. 234.
77. This principle of EU law covers similar ground to the Dormant Commerce Clause in the
U.S. that Professor Fallon argues would possibly be violated by some of the state laws he
discusses under the third fallacy. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 636–38.
78. Open Door Counselling, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 268.
79. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Eur., Sept.
21, 1970, Europ. T.S. 45, art. 10(2).
The exercise of these freedoms [freedom of expression], since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights
of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Id. (emphases added).
80. Open Door Counselling, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 268.
81. Id. at 266–67.
82. Id. at 270.
83. Id. at 270–84.
84. Id. at 268.
85. Case C-159/90, Soc’y for Prot. of Unborn Children v. Grogan (SPUC), 1991 E.C.R. I4685, 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991).
86. Id. at 890.
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the ECJ held that where provided in return for remuneration, and where legal,
abortion was indeed a “service” and so is protected under the fundamental
principle of freedom to provide services.87 On the other hand, it held that
Ireland had not violated this principle here, because the student organization
issuing the information was not itself providing a service or closely connected
to those who were.88 It was simply exercising freedom of expression.89
Accordingly, the ECJ did not give general guidance on the issue of the ability
of State A, in which abortion is illegal, to ban distribution of information about
lawfully operating abortion clinics in State B.
The third case of Attorney General v. X90 would have directly involved the
right to travel to obtain an abortion and whether Ireland’s constitutional ban
would violate either or both the ECHR and EU law. But with the Irish
Supreme Court’s somewhat surprising decision in favor of the teenage rape
victim, no case before either court has squarely raised the issue. Arguably the
answer for the EU follows from what the ECJ did say about services in
Grogan, as freedom to provide services likely includes or requires the freedom
to obtain them. Under the ECHR, the question would most likely be a difficult
one about the proportionality of such a measure.91
Finally, and this may be relevant to the issue of how likely the sort of laws
that Professor Fallon discusses with respect to the third fallacy would be in
practice if Roe were overruled, the Irish Constitution was amended following
the above three cases. According to the express terms of the amendments
approved by two-to-one popular majorities in the November 1992 referendum,
there is now both a right to travel outside Ireland for abortion purposes and a
right to supply and receive information on abortion services lawfully available
in other countries.92 So as of now, no country in western Europe has the type
of restrictive interstate laws that raise difficult questions of constitutional
federalism, even though most (for one reason or another) do not recognize a
87. Id. This provides comparative support for Professor Fallon’s view that abortion would
be considered a service in both the Commerce Clause and Dormant Commerce Clause contexts.
88. Id. at 893.
89. Id. at 891. The ECJ also held there was no free speech violation because, under its
standard threshold doctrine, autonomous national laws are not subject to its “fundamental rights”
jurisprudence, which bind only EU laws and member-state laws that implement or are otherwise
connected to EU laws. Id.
90. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
91. For another discussion of this trilogy of Irish cases, see Bryan Mercurio, Abortion in
Ireland: An Analysis of the Legal Transformation Resulting from Membership in the European
Union, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 141, 177 (2003).
92. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/
index.asp?docID=243 (“This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and
another state. . . . This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State,
subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully
available in another state.”).
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constitutional right to abortion. If these constitutional issues are ever resolved,
it seems more likely that the trigger for doing so will come from the new
member states of both organizations in central and eastern Europe, where
popular and religious opposition to abortion is stronger.
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